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Overview
• What is Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA)?
– A crewmember leaves the protective environment of a pressurized 
spacecraft cabin and ventures into the vacuum of space wearing 
an extravehicular spacesuit
• Why people and not robots?
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– There is a place for both 
and mission requirements 
drive architecture
– Adaptability
– Efficiency
– Judgment
– Flexible tool and worksite 
interfaces
– Human interest
Mission Objectives Drive Design
• A suit designed for 0-g EVAs (like those on ISS), may 
be significantly different than a suit used on a planetary 
surface
• Suits must always trade design drivers based on needs 
of mission. Very difficult to have a suit that does it all.
– Volume and mass – Rocket upmass, vehicle stowage, 
system redundancy, human endurance (on surface), 
mobility, EVA duration
– Mobility – ability to perform complex tasks, compatible 
with various crewmember sizes, design complexity, 
durability, crewmember protection, fatigue, prebreathe
requirements
– Lifetime – maintenance requirements, redundancy, part 
sparing
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EVA Requirements
• Oxygen to breathe
• Pressure
• Carbon dioxide removal
• Thermal protection
• Micrometeoroid Orbital 
Debris (MMOD) 
protection
• Radiation protection
What do 
we need 
to survive 
in a 
spacesuit?
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EVA Requirements
• Dexterity 
• Fatigue reduction
• Thermal/ humidity control
• Waist containment
• Communication
• Visibility
• Body restraint
• Tool compatibility
• Suit-friendly interfaces
What do 
we need 
to work in 
a 
spacesuit?
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50 Year Evolution of the Spacewalk
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March 1965:
Russian Cosmonaut 
Alexei Leonov
performs 1st 
Spacewalk , Ed 
White performs first 
US Spacewalk three 
months later 
1969: 
US Astronauts 
Armstrong and Aldrin
put 1st human 
footprints on Lunar 
Surface 
1973: 
US begins 
EVAs  on 
Skylab 
1979: 
Russia 
conducts
1st Salyut 
EVA
1987: 
1st Mir-based EVA 
for Russia
1998: 
1st EVA in support of 
ISS Assembly
2001: 
1st EVA
out of US segment 
of ISS
2008:
1st Chinese EVA
2015:
Completion of the 
184th EVA in support 
of ISS
1983: 
1st Space Shutte
EVA
Suit Purpose
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• Spacesuits
» 2 types of pressurized spacesuits have been constructed to support our space 
programs
Launch, entry, and abort (LEA) spacesuit
– Used to protect crewmembers from launch, ascent, 
abort, landing and other dynamic loading. 
– Capable of providing protection from loss of cabin 
pressure and crew rescue following landing.
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) spacesuit
– Used to allow crewmembers to work effectively in the 
harsh external space environment
Note: Gemini and Apollo used the same suit for launch, 
entry and EVAs. For Apollo, the crew reconfigured the 
suit during lunar transit to prepare for excursions on the 
surface.  The same concept has been proposed for Orion 
asteroid missions.
US Suit Evolution
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Mercury Suit
 Purpose:  Protect astronaut from 
space vacuum if cabin pressure lost
 Derived from Navy Mark-IV high 
altitude aircraft pressure suit
 Designed for unpressurized comfort
 Vehicle provided life support via 
umbilical
Gemini Suit
 Purpose:  First US space suit used both 
inside and outside the vehicle
 Derived from USAF AP/22 high altitude 
aircraft pressure suit 
 Designed for unpressurized comfort
 Incorporated cooling system
 Vehicle provided life support via umbilical
 9 EVAs totaling 12 hours 22 minutes
Apollo Suit
 Purpose:  Keep astronaut alive during 
Earth and lunar launch/re-entry, 
microgravity EVA, and lunar EVA
 Improved mobility features at shoulder, 
waist, knees, lower arms, and wrists
 First space suit with a portable life 
support system (PLSS)
 20 EVAs (surface and 0-g) ~ 170 hours
EMU Design Requirement
• NASA’s Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
(EMU)
– Designed for 6.5 hours of activity with 
30 minutes of reserve
– Zero fault tolerant, plus an abort 
capability
» Some single failures require emergency 
abort within 30 minutes
• EMU is an integrated system 
consisting of two subassemblies:
– Space Suit Assembly (SSA)
– Portable Life Support System (PLSS)
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Space Suit Assembly
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• Space Suit Assembly Components:
»Hard Upper Torso (HUT)/arms
»Lower Torso Assembly (LTA)
»Extravehicular (EV) gloves
»Helmet/Extravehicular Visor Assembly 
(EVVA)
»Communications Carrier Assembly 
(CCA; Comm Cap)
»Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment 
(LCVG) / Thermal Cooling Under-
Garment (TCU)
»Operational Bioinstrumentation System 
(EKG)
»Disposable In-Suit Drink Bag (DIDB)
»Maximum Absorption Garment (MAGs)
Cuff 
Checklist
Mini-
Workstation
Portable Life 
Support System 
(PLSS)
Lower 
Torso
1
0
Tether
Helmet
Lights
Gloves
Helmet
Hard 
Upper 
Torso 
(HUT)
Space Suit Assembly Pressure Retention
• Suit pressure selection trades mobility 
against prebreathe requirements
– Low pressure suits have less joint 
torque, but require longer prebreathe
protocols to purge nitrogen from blood 
and prevent decompression sickness
• EMU nominally pressurized to 4.3 psia
– Russian Orlan operating pressure = 5.8 
psia
– Apollo suit operating pressure = 3.7 
psia
• Suit pressure vessels can be rigid 
or flexible constructions
– EMU Hard Upper Torso (HUT)
– EMU urethane coated bladders
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Hard Upper Torso (HUT)
Lower Torso Assembly (LTA)
• Structural loads for flexible 
components are carried by 
restraints
– Circumferential restraints hold 
radial suit pressure (prevents 
bladder ballooning)
– Axial restraints hold axial suit 
pressure and crew loads along 
limbs
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Space Suit Assembly Pressure Retention
Suit Sizing
• Mercury and Gemini suits 
were all custom made to fit 
each astronaut
• Subsequent programs have 
incorporated resizing 
capability in suit design
– 0-g spinal growth can cause 
astronauts to grow 1”-2” in 
height
– EMU has multiple sizes of 
arms, legs, HUTs, waist/briefs, 
gloves which can be swapped 
out
» Fine adjustment can also be 
made with sizing rings, 
adjustment cams, and padded 
inserts
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Gloves
• Gloves have 
posed the 
greatest design 
challenge for 
suits
– Highest mobility 
requirements
– Sustains the 
greatest abuse 
from wear and 
abrasion
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Abrasion, MMOD, and Leak Prevention
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Glove damage during HST service mission
MMOD impact on EVA tool during STS-123 at ISS
• Loss of pressure integrity is a catastrophic 
hazard during EVA requiring immediate abort
• Suits have emergency oxygen supplies to 
feed leaks for ~30 minutes until crew can 
ingress and repress airlock
– For EMU, this assumes hole is < ~1/8th inch 
diameter. Larger holes would likely result in 
loss of crewmember
• Strict sharp edge requirements were used for 
ISS design
– Exposed threads, coder pins, edge radius, 
pinch points, etc.
– Extensive swatch tests and inspections 
performed on ground
• MMOD can directly impact suit and is also 
creating new sharp edges on ISS all the time
Case Study – Sharp Edge Risk 
Over the last 50 years of spacewalking,  we have modified our processes for 
controlling the risk of suits pressure integrity breach:
1. Inspect hardware for sharp edges prior flight
2. Inspect suit hardware when it comes home to see if being exposed to sharp  
edges
1. Made the gloves more resistant to sharp edge damage
2. Inspect gloves during use and established terminate criteria
3. Inspect the ISS for damage when the opportunity arises
4. Protect the crews against known/suspect sharp edge areas by either 
avoidance of the area or mechanical coverings
How do you determine that the appropriate amount of action has been taken 
to adequately control this risk?
What alternate approaches would you pursue?
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Critical Support Systems
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Portable Life 
Support 
System (PLSS)
Secondary 
Oxygen 
Package (SOP)
Display and 
Control Module 
(DCM)
Simplified Aid 
for EVA Rescue
(SAFER)
Primary Life Support Subsystem (PLSS) 
provides ~7 to 8 hours of:
• Breathing O2, 
• Suit pressure regulation
• Electrical power
• Communications
• Ventilation flow
• CO2, and trace contaminant removal
• Thermal/humidity regulation
• Performance monitoring
Secondary Oxygen Package (SOP) 
provides:
• Parachute-mode capability for critical 
single-string system failures 
• Minimum of 30 minutes of emergency O2 
in a controlled open-loop purge
• Maintains ventilation flow, CO2 washout, 
and minimal cooling while regulating to a 
reduced suit pressure
• Auto-activated based on suit pressure
Life Support System Functions
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Display and Control Module (DCM) provides:
• Crew member interface for 
• Caution & Warning System (CWS) messages
• EMU parameters
• EMU controls to crewmember
Supporting Systems
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Simplified Aid for EVA rescue (SAFER) 
provides:
• Single String Emergency Return to Vehicle 
Capability for a separated crewmember 
• Inert gas Propellant system with limited delta V 
capability
• 6 degree of freedom flight maneuverability with 
automatic attitude hold positioning
Fault Protection Design Strategy Discussion  
Fully Redundant 
Systems
Single-string with 
Autonomous/ Reliable/ 
Interchangeable 
Contingency mode
V.S.
What are the trades of each option?
Why did NASA choose the current design for its EVA 
suit?
Why is this concept different than the ISS 
design philosophy?
How would you choose your design approach?
The Danger of Suit Failures is Real
In July 2013, Luca Parmitano was conducting a US EVA on the ISS when he 
experienced one of the most significant real-time suit failures in the history of US 
EVAs.  Due to a malfunctioning water separator, water began to collect in his helmet, 
impeding his vision, communication, and encroaching his airways.
His blog gives a chilling first hand description of the event 
http://blogs.esa.int/luca-parmitano/2013/08/20/eva-23-exploring-the-frontier/
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“…By now, the upper part of the helmet is full of water and I can’t 
even be sure that the next time I breathe I will fill my lungs with air 
and not liquid. To make matters worse, I realize that I can’t even 
understand which direction I should head in to get back to the 
airlock. I can’t see more than a few centimeters in front of me, not 
even enough to make out the handles we use to move around the 
Station…”
“…I try to contact Chris and Shane: I listen as they talk to each 
other, but their voices are very faint now: I can hardly hear them 
and they can’t hear me. I’m alone. I frantically think of a plan. It’s 
vital that I get inside as quickly as possible…”
Case study – Fan/Pump/Water Failures 
In recent years of ISS EVA operations, NASA has experienced four on-orbit 
system failures of the Fan/Pump/Water Separator component in the EMU.  
The effects of these failures was significant in many ways:
 They confirmed the suits reliance on proper water quality 
 They uncovered an understated, under-evaluated, under-mitigated risk to 
crew in a system that was in operation for over 30 years
 They confirmed the need to enact previously uncertified in-flight repairs of the 
space suit
 They challenged the NASA team with effectively managing the risk of 
continued use of a space suit design with a possible systemic issue against 
the risk of being without US EVA capability on the ISS
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Tool and Equipment Interfaces
• Purpose
– Restrain/stabilize crew
» Foot restraints, tethers
– Restrain hardware
» Tethers, bags, caddies
– Contain trash
– Improve visibility 
» Lights, mirrors, cameras
– Perform tasks
» Torque tools, sockets, leverage tools, 
fluid/electrical actuators
– Crew procedures
» Cuff checklists
• How are tools different for 0-g 
compared to surface based 
spacewalks?
23
Crew Restraint
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Restraint method 
often trades stability 
against overhead to 
set up.
Allows ability to 
work with hands, 
react torque, control 
large mass
Flexible tether – fast and easy, low control
Rigid tether – Requires dogbone, hands 
free, moderate control
Foot restraint – high overhead, best control
Design for Human in the Loop
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EVA Training and Development Facilities
• Simulating the 0-g EVA environment is impossible with a 
single facility. Instead we build our understanding based on 
contributions from several testing environments.
• Facility choice is driven by cost, specific test objectives, and 
merit/shortcoming of specific facilities
– Quality of 0-g
– Thermal
– Vacuum
– Vehicle/robotic interfaces
– Suit and mockup fidelity 
26
Neutral Buoyancy
• Early Gemini flights identified the 
difficulty with performing EVA tasks.
• Underwater neutral buoyancy 
training was first adopted for Gemini 
12 and has been the primary 
training environment since
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PROS
• Large work volume (limited by 
pool size)
• Accommodates vehicle 
mockups and robotic 
integration
• Fully pressurized, medium 
fidelity suit
• Test durations up to ~6 hours
CONS
• Water drag
• Buoyance induces righting 
moments, and 1-g effects 
on suit/tools
• Thermal/Vacuum not 
simulated
Buzz Aldrin during Gemini12 (above)
ISS NBL training (below)
Virtual Reality
• 3-D immersive graphical 
environment
• Easy to update vehicle 
configuration
• Ground and on-orbit training 
allows worksite review close to 
EVA date
• Accurate robotics trajectories (not 
limited by pool floor)
• Easy to train directional 
disorientation (no perceived 
gravity vector relative to vehicle)
• Unpressurized shirt sleeve 
training
– No physical challenges of working 
with suit/tools
– Less overhead to conduct training
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0-G Parabolic Flight
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• No drag, suited, 0-g
• Limited to ~20 second parabolas
• Limited volume to size of aircraft cabin
• Due to cost, overhead, and limitations 
not used for standard training. Has been 
used for development testing.
Gravity Offload Facilities
• Low drag environment
• Unpressurized shirt sleeve 
training
• Good for training torque reaction, 
mass handling in complement 
with NBL and VR
• Limited work volume constraints
• Body orientation constrained to 
horizontal (multi-axis gimbal 
harness in development)
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Space Vehicle Mockup Facility (SVMF)
• Used to train intra-vehicular (IV) 
activities
– EVA Prep/Post
– Prebreathe
– Maintenance
– Resize
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Vacuum Chambers
• Demonstrates vacuum 
performance of flight suits, life 
support systems, and airlock 
components
• No 0-g simulation, suit weight 
offloaded with suspension device
• Some facilities can control 
thermal environment as well for 
best representation of space
• Large vacuum chambers can 
allow some limited task testing
– Example: JSCs Human Thermal 
Vacuum chamber used for testing of 
Shuttle Thermal Protection repair 
techniques
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Access to Flight Hardware
The single most important thing that can be done to 
prepare for EVAs is to have the crew and ground 
controllers intimately familiar with the flight hardware
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On a vehicle like ISS, all worksites can be designed for 
EVA compatibility…
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Design Interfaces
• Consideration for EVA 
compatibility must be 
pervasive through 
vehicle design
– Captive washer prevents 
bolt from flying away
– Rounded edges to 
prevent sharp edges
– Common bolt head size 
which has been fit-
checked to verify 
compliance
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Design Interfaces (Continued)
• Labeling
• Tether point
– Hole size designed to prevent finger 
entrapment, allow tether hooks
• Robotic interfaces/EVA handling aids
• Visual Lock/Unlock indicator
• Electrical connectors compatible with 
pressurized, gloved hand. Each plug and jack 
uniquely labeled
• Handrail
– Positioned for crew stability at worksite
– 575 lbf Load certified for safety tether
– Dog bone shape for rigid tether (BRT) 
interface
• Cable routing/restraint
• Epoxy covered bolt threads (sharp edge 
protection)
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How do the suit and tools need to change to interface 
with the Moon or Mars?
How about an asteroid?
~0-gravity
Unknown rock hardness and cohesion
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Human Spaceflight Operations
A Recent Challenge in EVA
This box is 
broken
It takes power from solar arrays
and distributes to downstream 
loads
BUT ONLY IF YOU CAN 
MATE THIS BOLT
MBSU Bolt Case Study
• Halfway through driving bolt, the running torque 
increases and bolt binds.
• Crew backs out bolt and reattempts
– Each time it binds at about the same turn count.
• Insufficient turns to create electrical connector 
contact
• Ground teams recall difficulties installing unit, due to 
orientation and weight relief system (may have 
caused side-loading on interface.)
• Spare unit inside ISS has different function, but 
same bolt design 
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MBSU Case Study
Solar Array Case Study
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• During ISS assembly a truss segment and solar array had to be 
relocated. During re-deployment of solar array the following damage was 
observed.
– Array was only partially deployed and unable to sustain docking/undocking 
loads
– The Space Shuttle is planned to undock within the week
Solar Array Case Study
• Ground teams examined engineering test 
units and focused on holes in array 
blankets which were used to secure 
blankets during launch
• Crew was given procedures to build “cuff 
links” out of spare electrical wire and 
sheets of teflon
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Solar Array Case Study
• Within days EVA procedures were written, tools built, robotic trajectories 
planned, crew trained, and repair implemented
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Solar Array Case Study
• Post flight failure analysis determine that an MMOD strike had damaged 
some strands on a braided guide cable which then snagged on the array 
during extension.
• Repair solution did not require launch of any unique hardware, but used 
materials never intended for this purpose
• All crew training for task performed on-orbit
• Shock hazard required all tools be insulated with kapton tape
• Crew access required use of a robotic extension boom used for inspecting 
shuttle thermal tiles.
• Failure to repair could have collapsed array during Shuttle undock and 
significantly reduced power availability for life of ISS  
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Lessons Learned
• Don’t underestimate the challenges of seemingly simple tasks
• Design hardware to be as easy to use as possible, it will still be difficult
• When you design something, recognize that you won’t know how it is really 
going to be used (build margin/flexibility into your design) 
• Consider going beyond the current requirements (anticipate what the future 
may bring)
• Beware the Unintended Consequences
– More water quality sampling/ conditioning may expose hardware to 
corrosion
– More neutral buoyancy training can expose crews to unnecessary injury 
risk
– Untested operations can a uncover unanticipated results
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Lessons Learned
• Access to/ knowledge of flight hardware is crucial to proper preparation
• The environment will affect your hardware over time – expect that things will change
– Bolt torques change due to lube degradation
– New sharp edges are introduced every day
– Connectors and cabling and mechanisms get stiffer over time
– Dust/ Foreign Object Debris must be controlled
– Water quality will vary
• Past experience doesn’t guarantee you fully understand every susceptibility of your 
system 
– Expect to be surprised, but do everything you can not to be
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